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1. Introduction 
This study aims to identify the effect of mergers on airline efficiency using the merger cases of Chinese 
airlines in the early 2000s. Identifying the possible efficiency gains from a merger is a core issue in merger 
evaluation. The US Horizontal Merger Guideline (U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission 2010) noted that the “primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate 
significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may 
result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.” Scholars have made great 
efforts to empirically quantify the effect of mergers on productivity for various industries. A comprehensive 
review of such studies can be found in Kolaric and Schiereck (2014).  
Major airline mergers in recent decades have created some of the world’s largest airlines. These 
mergers have generated many policy debates around the world. Past studies (Borenstein 1990, Kim and 
Singal 1993, Prager and Hannan 1998, Bilotkach 2010, Kwoka and Shumilkina 2010) have identified anti-
competitive effects of airline mergers. However, as Peters (2006) pointed out, these studies normally omit 
supply-side factors such as cost. In the airline industry, higher traffic volumes allow the use of larger, more 
efficient aircraft, and more intensive utilization of aircraft, airport facilities, and ground equipment. Such 
“economies of density” effects have been found in empirical studies (Caves et al. 1984, Brueckner and 
Spiller 1991, 1994). Moreover, increasing traffic volume leads to more frequent flights, which reduces 
schedule delays,1 a major determinant of service quality for airlines (Anderson and Kraus 1981, Richard 
2003). An increase in service quality will in turn generate positive feedback that adds to the economies of 
density.2 By aggregating the traffic volumes of the firms involved, airline mergers are expected to bring 
efficiency gains. This study explores these effects of airline mergers on productivity and costs.  
The most challenging problem that empirical studies face in attempting to identify the effects of 
mergers is endogeneity. Mergers are likely to be driven by efficiency concerns, and this endogeneity will 
bias the estimates of merger effects in empirical approaches that fail to control for it. One approach to 
address the endogeneity is to use instrument variables that are correlated with the merger decision but not 
with firm efficiency. However, finding a truly exogenous instrument variable is a daunting task. Another 
approach to address the endogeneity is to adopt a structural model that incorporates the model of the merger 
decision directly into the analysis. Examples of this structural approach can be found in Nevo (2000), 
                                                          
1 Schedule delay was first proposed by Douglas-Miller (1974a, b); it refers to the difference between travelers’ ideal 
and actual departure time.  
2 Supporting evidence was found for the SAS-Swiss alliance (Youssef and Hansen 1994) and airline code-sharing 
agreements in the trans-Pacific markets (Oum et al. 1996, Park 1997, and Oum et al. 2000). Clougherty (2002) showed 
that US airlines’ international competitiveness could be enhanced through economies of density in the domestic market. 
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Gugler and Siebert (2007) and Egger and Hahn (2010). The major criticism of this structural approach is 
that the model normally relies on many assumptions that are difficult to justify (Angrist and Pischke 2010).    
The mergers of Chinese airlines, the focus of our investigation, were created by the national policy 
pursued by the Chinese government in the early 2000s. The policy forced small state-owned firms in 
industries deemed as a “life-line” to the nation, such as the airline, automobile, electricity and steel 
industries, to merge into large, state-owned enterprise groups. The government’s main motivation in 
pursuing such a strategy was to strengthen its influence over the entire economy (Pearson 2007). As such, 
the mergers of Chinese airlines in the early 2000s can be properly treated as a natural experiment that allows 
us to bypass the issue of endogeneity to measure the effects of the merger on airline efficiency. Given the 
exogeneity of the mergers, we apply the difference-in-differences (DID) approach to identify the effects of 
the merger on both the total factor productivity (TFP) and operational costs of Chinese airlines. The control 
group in the DID estimation includes major airlines in Asia, Europe, and North America. We find that the 
merger increased the efficiency of the merged airlines and the finding is robust with respect to various 
identification assumptions. 
 This study complements the large number of studies reviewed by Kolaric and Schiereck (2014) on 
identifying the effects of mergers on firm efficiency. In particular, as a case study on airlines, this paper 
contributes directly to the literature on the effects of mergers and alliances on airlines’ productivity.3 The 
findings provide valuable insights for industry practitioners and government regulators at a time when 
waves of mergers are taking place in the world’s major aviation markets.    
 
2. Industry Background 
The airline industry in China was under military control until it was separated from the air force in 1980. 
From 1987 to 1991, six major state-owned airlines were formed. The airlines and their hub airports, based 
in national or provincial cities, were Air China (Beijing), China Eastern (Shanghai), China Northwest 
(Xi’an), China Northern (Shenyang), China Southwest (Chengdu), and China Southern (Guangzhou). A 
number of small/regional airlines were subsequently formed, including a couple of private carriers and low 
cost carriers. Air fares had been progressively deregulated since 1992 (Zhang and Round 2008), and route 
entry regulations were removed from all airports except those in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (Fu et 
al. 2015a). From 1997 to 2004, the three largest airlines, China Eastern, China Southern, and Air China, 
were partially privatized through IPOs in domestic and overseas stock exchanges, although they have 
always been majority state owned. As of today, legacy regulations remain in areas such as aircraft purchases, 
                                                          
3 See, for example Oum and Zhang (2001), Goh and Yong (2006), Chow and Fung (2012), and Wang et al. (2014). 
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pilot training and recruitment, airport charges, and slot allocations at congested airports. A few state-owned 
companies effectively monopolize the jet fuel supply and IT systems for ticket distribution and airport 
departures (Fu et al., 2015b). Thanks to strong economic growth and progressive deregulation, the number 
of air passengers increased at an annual rate of 14.9% from 1990 to 2010, and by 2005, China’s aviation 
market had become the second largest in the world.  
During the wave of mergers in China’s life-line industries, the nine largest airlines, all of which 
were state-owned, were forced to merge to become three airline groups - China Eastern Airlines, China 
Southern Airlines, and Air China.4 There are two notable features associated with these mergers. First, 
although the actual consolidations were separately carried out over the following years, they were ratified 
and announced on the same day,5 and completed in 2004. Because these mergers were simultaneously 
imposed and led by the government, the influences of merger endogeneity and competition dynamics, 
which would otherwise lead to waves of mergers and endogeneity in the estimation, were reduced to a 
minimum. Second, the government clearly aimed to create three airline groups with comparable sizes and 
networks. After the mergers, the “big three” airlines (China Eastern, China Southern, and Air China) had 
comparable levels of registered capital, fleet sizes, and numbers of employees (Shaw et al. 2009). The 
merging airlines’ networks were complementary to each other, thus the merged carriers each controlled one 
mega-hub and had comparable national networks. For example, only 12% of China National’s routes and 
11% of China Southwest’s routes overlapped with Air China’s in 2001, before the mergers. Similar patterns 
held for the other two airline groups. No sustained collusion was identified during and after these mergers 
in the Chinese aviation market (Zhang and Round 2009, Zhang et al. 2014). 
 
3. Research Design 
The government-guided mergers of Chinese airlines between 2002 and 2004 provide a rare natural 
experiment to bypass the endogeneity issue in merger evaluation. We take this opportunity to identify the 
effects of mergers on airline productivity and costs using the DID approach as our identification strategy.  
  The first step in implementing the DID identification is to construct a control group of airlines that 
share similar characteristics to the three Chinese airlines - China Eastern, China Southern, and Air China - 
operating in both domestic and international markets. The ideal control group should contain similar 
Chinese airlines that were not affected by the mergers. However, as the mergers grouped all of the largest 
                                                          
4 Specifically, China Eastern airlines merged with China Northwest and Yunnan airlines; China Southern merged 
with China Northern and Xinjiang airlines; and Air China merged with China Southwest and CNAC airlines. 
5 These mergers were first ratified by the State Council in the “Civil Aviation System Reform Programme” on Mar 3, 
2002 (Zhang and Round 2008), and the Civil Aviation Administration of China subsequently announced the creation 
of the “Big Three” airline groups on Oct 11, 2002 (Shaw et al. 2009). 
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airlines into the big three, those unaffected were small regional airlines. We therefore use major airlines in 
Asia, Europe, and North America to construct the control group, which is appropriate for the DID 
identification for the following reasons. First, the airlines included in our analysis are homogenous in the 
sense that they are all so-called “full service airlines” that adopt the same business model and similar 
operational strategies (in terms of aviation networks, pricing strategy/revenue management, fleet 
composition, airport choice and operation, alliance/code-share practices, frequent flier programs, ticket 
distribution, etc.). Second, the airlines in our sample are of comparable sizes, and are all leading carriers in 
their respective home markets (in terms of size and network). They all have growing international services 
to other major aviation markets, and are members of major global airline alliances. Finally, one major 
objective of the government-guided mergers in China was to create firms that could compete with major 
foreign airlines. The Chinese regulators and airlines have used the airlines included in our control group as 
benchmarks. The airlines included in our analysis are reported in Table 1.  
The next step in implementing the DID identification is to compile data from both treated and controlled 
airlines in both pre-merger and post-merger periods. The annual reports of the airlines are main data source. 
We use the calendar year in our analysis, although a few carriers have different financial years. Most airlines 
in our sample have subsidiary airlines, which are included in our analysis if the corresponding revenues and 
costs are included in the sample airlines’ annual reports. Because the mergers of Chinese airlines were 
completed in 2004, we use 3 years before 2004 as the pre-merger period and 7 years after 2004 (including 
2004) as the post-merger period. Many data items for Chinese airlines are not available before 2001. Related 
details are summarized in Table 1.  
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Table 1. List of Airlines Included 
Airline Group  Fiscal Year  Airlines included in annual reports 
China Eastern Jan 1 to Dec 31 China Eastern Airlines 
China Northwest Airlines (since Jan 1, 2005) 
China Yunnan Airlines (since Jan 1, 2005) 
Shanghai Airlines (since Jan 1, 2010) 
China Southern  Jan 1 to Dec 31 China Southern Airlines 
China Northern Airlines (since Jan 1, 2005) 
China Xinjiang Airlines (since Jan 1, 2005) 
Air China Jan 1 to Dec 31 Air China Airlines  
China Southwest Airlines (since Jan 1 2001) 
CNAC (since Jan 1 2001) 
Shenzhen Airlines (since Apr 20, 2010) 
Thai Airways Oct 1 to Sep 30 Thai Airways 
Singapore Airlines        Apr 1 to Mar 30 SIA 
SIA Cargo 
SilkAir  
Cathay Pacific  Jan 1 to Dec 31 Cathay Pacific Airways (including cargo operation) 
Air Hong Kong  
Dragon Air (since Oct 1, 2006) 
AMR Jan 1 to Dec 31 American Airlines  
AMR Eagle: American Eagle, Executive airlines  
Delta Jan 1 to Dec 31 Delta Airlines 
Comair  
ASA (not included since Sept 2005) 
Northwest (since Oct 30, 2008) 
United Jan 1 to Dec 31 United Airlines 
United Express (since Jan 1, 2010) 
Continental airlines ( since Oct 1, 2010)  
Continental  
(2001 to 2009) 
Jan 1 to Dec 31 Continental airlines  
Expressjet  
Air Canada 
 
Jan 1 to Dec 31 Air Canada 
Jazz Air, ZIP, Air Canada Tango 
Canadian Air 
Lufthansa  Jan 1 to Dec 31 Lufthansa Airlines  
Lufthansa’s regional carriers 
SWISS (since Mar 2005) 
Austrian airlines (since Sep 2009) 
British Midland airlines (since Nov 2009) 
Air France 
(2002 to 2004) 
Apr 1 to Mar 31 Air France  
Brit Air, Cityjet, Regional  
KLM 
(2001 to 2004) 
Apr 1 to Mar 31 KLM 
Cityhopper, Cityhopper UK 
Air France- KLM 
(2005 to 2010) 
Apr 1 to Mar 31 Air France group 
KLM group 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample airlines in 2005 
    Source: Company’s annual reports 
  Revenue Fuel Cost RPK No. of  Passenger Cargo Incidental Load No. of  
Airline (1000 USD) (1000 USD) (1000 RPK) Employees Revenue % Revenue % Revenue % Factor Aircraft 
Asia Pacific          
China Eastern    3,431,829    1,084,761     36,380,580    29,301  76.0% 18.1% 5.9% 69.39% 197 
China Southern    4,673,117    1,455,765     61,923,000    34,417  89.6% 8.1% 2.3% 70.10% 247 
Air China    4,672,869    1,437,231     52,404,800    30,592  82.5% 9.7% 7.8% 74.20% 174 
Thai Airways    4,039,973    1,146,210     49,931,000    25,876  79.5% 15.7% 4.8% 71.50% 87 
Singapore airlines    7,217,567    1,617,943     77,593,700    28,554  63.8% 21.9% 14.3% 74.10% 114 
Cathay Pacific    6,545,817    2,004,286     65,110,000    15,806  62.9% 31.0% 6.2% 78.70% 130 
North America          
American Airlines  20,712,000    5,615,000   237,088,558    88,400  90.6% 3.8% 5.6% 78.02% 1,001 
Delta   16,480,000    4,466,000   193,047,250    55,700  88.5% 3.2% 8.3% 76.50% 649 
United  17,379,000    4,032,000   183,902,958    57,000  88.3% 4.2% 7.5% 81.40% 460 
Continental  11,208,000    2,443,000   129,067,779    39,530  91.3% 3.7% 5.0% 78.90% 622 
Air Canada    7,805,154    1,813,060     75,256,144    24,000  86.7% 6.6% 6.7% 79.50% 312 
Europe          
Lufthansa  22,465,552    3,310,451   108,184,500    90,811  62.6% 14.3% 23.0% 75.00% 432 
Air France-KLM  24,209,073    3,299,259   168,998,000   102,077  79.0% 13.2% 7.8% 78.70% 568 
Airline Horizontal Mergers and Productivity: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China 
Yan, Fu, Oum and Wang 
7 
 
We cross-checked the annual reports using additional data sources.6 These references include the 
International Civil Aviation Organization databases, the financial and operational data reported by the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics in the United States, and the Statistical Data on Civil Aviation in China 
issued by the Civil Aviation Administration of China. We obtained aircraft leasing prices from Avmark, a 
company that specializes in aircraft leasing and financing data analysis. A brief description of the data items 
is provided below and further details can be found in Wang et al. (2014). 
 Output 1. Total passenger services: scheduled and non-scheduled operations measured in Revenue-
Passenger-Kilometers (RPK), converted to Revenue-Ton-Kilometers (RTK). 
 Output 2. Total freight services: scheduled and non-scheduled operations measured in RTK. 
 Output 3. Incidental services: a catch-all item for all output not included in passenger and freight 
services, such as catering, ground handling, aircraft maintenance for other airlines, consulting, and 
hotel business.  
 Input 1. Labor: yearly number of full-time employees.  
 Input 2. Fuel: gallons of jet fuel consumed. 
 Input 3. Flight equipment: number of aircraft by type. Using leasing prices as weights, different 
types of aircraft are aggregated into a fleet quantity index using the translog multilateral index 
procedure proposed by Caves et al. (1982) and Oum et al. (2005) for the TFP calculation.  
 Input 4: Ground property and equipment (GPE): the capital stock of GPE is reported in airlines’ 
financial reports. A GPE price index is obtained using the method proposed by Christensen and 
Jorgenson (1969).  
 Input 5. Material inputs: this is a catch-all item for all other inputs and costs. 
As the GPE cost is much smaller than the fleet equipment cost, the GPE and fleet equipment costs are 
categorized together as a single capital input in the TFP calculation. Both the quantities and the 
corresponding revenues/costs are compiled for the inputs and outputs listed above; for example, the 
volumes and costs of jet fuel are compiled. The only exception is flight equipment, for which market leasing 
prices are used. 
 
4. Empirical Approach 
We use the following regression equation to implement the DID estimation: 
itiiiititit cTrendTrendMergery   γZBX      (1) 
                                                          
6 The complete dataset was reviewed by researchers at the Academy of Civil Aviation Science and Technology in 
Beijing, which publishes the official statistics for the aviation operations of Chinese airlines. 
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where ity  is the efficiency outcome of airline i  in year t ; itMerger  is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if i  represents one of the three Chinese Airlines and t  is after the merger event; itX  is a 
vector of the time-varying explanatory variables that affect the efficiency outcome of interest; 
iZ is a vector 
of the time-invariant explanatory variables, such as country dummies; Trend captures technology 
changes in the airline industry that are common to all airlines; Trendi  , with i  as a random value, 
allows each airline to have its own time path of efficiency change; finally, the random individual effects (ci) 
capture the time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity in efficiency. Our research question focuses 
on the estimate of  .  
 A simple OLS regression of Equation (1) leads to inconsistent estimates because the regressors are 
expected to be correlated with both random individual trends and time-invariant random individual effects. 
Let   denote the first-order difference operator, and we have  
itiititit Mergery   BX        (2) 
The remaining individual effects in Equation (2) can be further removed by demeaning  
       iitiitiitiit MergerMergeryy  BXX      (3) 
where 


 


1
11
1 R
t
iti y
R
y and R  denotes the number of years in the panel data;  iX ,  iMerger , and 
 i are defined in the same way. Equation (3) is free of individual time trends and individual effects, so 
the remaining parameters can be consistently estimated by OLS regression given that the merger of Chinese 
airlines was imposed by the government. In our empirical analysis, we use the estimate of   from Equation 
(3) to infer the effect of merger on airline efficiency.  
 A merger could affect not only the level of efficiency, but also the change in the efficiency level. 
To account for this possibility, we also estimate a variation of model 1 as 
itiiiit
ititit
cTrendTrend
TrendMergerMergery




γZBX        
                (4) 
Let TrendMergerMT itit  ; differencing and demeaning of this equation leads to the following 
estimable regression equation: 
   
   



iitiit
iitiitiit
MTMTMergerMergeryy


BXX                   
            (5) 
The OLS estimates from Equation (5) give us consistent estimates on the effects of merger on both the 
efficiency level and the change in the efficiency level.   
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We use both a nonparametric approach, in which the dependent variable in Equation (1) is the 
computed TFP of the airlines, and a parametric approach, in which Equation (1) is specified as a translog 
total cost function of the airlines. We compare the results from these two approaches and draw robust 
findings from the comparison.     
In the nonparametric analysis, the TFP computation method is identical to that of Wang et al. (2014), 
which follows the approach adopted by Windle and Drenser (1992), Oum and Yu (1995), and Oum et al. 
(2005). The output and input variables described above are aggregated into a multilateral output and a 
multilateral input index, respectively, following the translog multilateral index procedure   
𝑇𝑖 = ∏ (
𝑇𝑘𝑖
?̃?𝑘
)
(𝑅𝑘𝑖+?̅?𝑘)
2 ,𝑘   𝑇𝑗 = ∏ (
𝑇𝑘𝑗
?̃?𝑘
)
(𝑅𝑘𝑗+?̅?𝑘)
2   𝑘    (6.1) 
   𝑆𝑖 = ∏ (
𝑆𝑝𝑖
?̃?𝑝
)
(𝑊𝑝𝑖+?̅̅̅?𝑝)
2 ,𝑝   𝑆𝑗 = ∏ (
𝑆𝑝𝑗
?̃?𝑝
)
(𝑊𝑝𝑗+?̅̅̅?𝑝)
2  𝑝   (6.2) 
where 𝑖 and 𝑗 denote different airlines and time periods, respectively, and 
𝑄𝑘𝑖 is the output 𝑘 for observation 𝑖;  
𝑅𝑘𝑖 is the revenue share of output 𝑘 for observation 𝑖;  
?̅?𝑘 is the arithmetic mean of the revenue shares of output 𝑘 over all observations; 
?̃?𝑘 is the geometric mean of output 𝑘 over all observations; 
𝑆𝑝𝑖 is the input 𝑝 for observation i ;  
𝑊𝑝𝑖 is the input cost shares of input 𝑝 for observation 𝑖; and 
?̃?𝑝 is the geometric mean of input 𝑝 over all observations. 
TFP is defined as the ratio of the output index to the input index, or 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖/𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗 =
𝑇𝑖
𝑇𝑗
/
𝑆𝑖
𝑆𝑗
.   
In the parametric approach, we estimate the total costs of airline i  in year t  as  ititit fC WQ , , 
which is the function of a vector of output quantities ( itQ ) and a vector of input prices ( itW ). The log of 
the total cost function is approximated using the translog functional form, such that we have an empirical 
cost equation as in Equation (1), in which ity  is the log of the total costs of airline i  in year t , and itX  is 
the vector including the log of output and input prices and their interactions. Other control variables in 
Equation (1) capture the heterogeneity across airlines and across time in the airlines’ total costs. The 
coefficient of the merger dummy,  , measures the effect of the merger on the airlines’ total costs; a 
negative   indicates that the merger reduced the total costs of the Chinese airlines by improving their 
productivity.    
  Because the cost shares of inputs contain information on the cost parameters, the precision of the 
cost parameter estimates can be improved by incorporating input share equations in the estimation. By 
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Shephard’s lemma, the share of input g  in the total cost is 
 
g
it
itititg
it
w
C
s
ln
,ln



WQ
, where 
g
itw  is the price 
of input g  for airline i  in year t . Applying Shephard’s lemma to Equation (1), we have the following 
input share equations: 
4,3,2,1 ,  gs git
g
i
gg
it
g
it BX          (7) 
where 
g
itX is a subset of itX  and 
g
B is a subset of B , and gi  is the individual effects accounting for the 
panel nature of the data. We specify the individual effects as random to be consistent with the cost equation. 
To avoid the singularity problem, three of the four input share equations can be jointly estimated along with 
Equation (1) as a system of equations. The estimation results are invariant to the choice of share equation. 
As such, our empirical model to identify the causal effects of mergers on airline costs comprises four 
equations—the translog total cost in Equation (1) and the three input share equations denoted by Equation 
(7). The four equations contain common cost parameters.   
Following the same strategy of differencing and demeaning in estimating the TFP equation, we 
obtain an estimable cost equation that is free of individual effects and individual time trends, as in Equation 
(3). The random individual effects in the input share equations can be removed by demeaning as follows: 
 
   gigitggigitgigit ss   BXX         (8) 
The cost equation in (3) and the three input share equations in (8) constitute a system of equations that 
should be jointly estimated to account for the common parameters in the equations. We estimate the system 
of equations using a GMM approach, in which the moment functions are the orthogonal conditions between 
the regressors and error terms in equations (3) and (8), and the weighting matrix accounts for both within-
equation and cross-equation correlations between error terms from the same airlines. We specify that the 
correlations among the errors have a general or unstructured pattern. As such, the identification of the cost 
system is robust in the sense that it does not rely on a distribution assumption for the error terms and it does 
not impose restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of error terms as in the seemingly unrelated 
regression specification.  
 
5. Results 
Before presenting the findings from the formal DID analyses, we first present the average TFP 
values for both the Chinese airlines and the control airlines from 2001 to 2010 in Figure 1. The government-
guided mergers among Chinese airlines were first announced in 2002 and the actual integrations were 
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completed in 2004. Figure 1 indicates that there was a clear upward trend in the average TFP value of 
Chinese airlines after 2003.  
Although the increased TFP of Chinese airlines is evidence of the positive effect of the mergers on 
the productivity of the airlines, it may be due to the time trend of technology changes in the industry. In the 
DID estimation, this time trend is removed by using the productivity change in the control group. The 
identification assumption of the DID approach is that the productivity changes in treated and controlled 
airlines would follow the same time trend if there were no mergers. One simple check for the validity of 
the identification assumption is to compare the TFP change of the controlled airlines with that of the treated 
airlines in the pre-merger period. Figure 1 plots the TFP change of the airlines included in the control group. 
If we partition the control group into North American, European and Asian airlines, we can see that the 
TFP of the three Chinese airlines and that of the Asian airlines included in the control group follow very 
similar dynamics in the pre-merger period. We use the complete control group in the baseline DID 
estimation, and then use only Asian airlines in the control group to implement the DID estimation in the 
robustness checks.  
 
Figure 1. Change in TFP over time 
Note: The vertical line in Figure 1 indicates the year when the forced merger of Chinese Airlines occurred. The 
merger occurred in Nov 2003, so the annual report of 2004 was the first annual report after the merger.   
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Table 3 presents the DID estimates of the effect of merger on TFP, based on Equations (3) and (5). 
Log TFP is the dependent variable and the control variables include time trends and time-invariant variables 
such as country and airline dummies, which are removed by differencing and demeaning. The post-merger 
period for the Chinese airlines in the baseline regressions reported in Table 3 is 2004-2010. Models 1 and 
2 present the estimates for the full sample and the results indicate that the mergers significantly increased 
both the level of TFP and the growth rate of TFP of Chinese airlines. Because airlines from different 
countries may have been affected differently by the financial crisis in 2008, we drop all observations after 
2007 in model 3. We exclude non-Asian airlines from the control group in model 4. The positive effect of 
merger on the TFP of Chinese airlines is robust with respect to variations in the estimation sample.       
 
Table 3. Difference-in-Differences Regression Results on the Effect of Merger on Airline TFP (Dependent 
variable: log TFP) 
 (1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Full sample 
with time trend 
(3) 
Drop 
observations 
after 2007 
(4) 
Excluding non-
Asian airlines 
from the 
control group  
Merger dummy 0.1346 
(0.0297) 
0.1573 
(0.0291) 
0.1324 
(0.0338) 
0.1573 
(0.0311) 
Merger Dummy × Time Trend  0.0302 
(0.0110) 
  
Number of Observations 125 125 83 54 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the airline level.   
 
The complete effect of a merger on airline efficiency may not be realized until several years after 
the merger. By specifying the post-merger period as the years immediately following the consolidations, 
the baseline regressions in Table 3 may capture transitional effects of the mergers. In an additional set of 
robustness checks, we change the definition of the post-merger period and drop the observations in the 
transition period. The results of these robustness checks are presented in Table 4. We find a larger effect of 
merger on airlines’ TFP if we define the post-merger period as between 2 and 5 years after the merger.   
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Table 4. Robustness of Difference-in-Differences TFP Regression Results to Different Post-Merger Periods 
 (1) 
Post-merger 
period: 
2005-2010; 
observations 
in 2004 
dropped 
(2) 
Post-merger 
period: 
2006-2010; 
observations 
in 2004–
2005 
dropped 
(3) 
Post-merger 
period:  
2009-2010; 
observations 
in 2004–
2008 
dropped 
(4) 
Post-merger period: 
2009-2010;  
observations in 2004–
2008 dropped; non-
Asian airlines 
excluded from control 
group 
Merger dummy 0.1476 
(0.0313) 
0.2246 
(0.0425) 
0.2894 
(0.0262) 
0.2893 
(0.0280) 
Number of Observations 111 97 55 24 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the airline level.   
In sum, from the TFP regressions we find a significantly positive effect of merger on the TFP of 
Chinese airlines. The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 show that the mergers in 2003 increased the TFP 
of Chinese airlines in subsequent years by 13–29%.   
Tables 5–7 report the findings from the parametric approach; that is, the estimates from the translog 
cost regression. In the baseline specification, the translog cost equation is specified as in Equation (1) and 
we estimate it along with three input share equations jointly. The results from the baseline specification are 
presented in Table 5. All of the cost parameter estimates have the expected signs. The airlines’ total costs 
are most sensitive to the change in passenger services among the three outputs and to the changes in fuel 
and material prices among the four inputs. We conduct a hypothesis test based on the baseline estimates 
and cannot reject the null hypothesis that the airlines’ production technology exhibits a constant return to 
scale.      
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Table 5. Baseline Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of Merger on Airline Total Costa 
Variables Estimates 
 (Standard Errors) b 
Log of Passenger Services 0.8719 (0.1013) 
Log of Freight Services 0.0093 (0.0782) 
Log of Incidental Services 0.0182 (0.0537) 
Log of Capital Price 0.1593 (0.0476) 
Log of Labor Price 0.1441 (0.0662) 
Log of Fuel Price 0.3287 (0.0361) 
Log of Passenger Services × Log of Passenger Services 0.0167 (0.1614) 
Log of Passenger Services × Log of Freight Services 0.3098 (0.1340) 
Log of Passenger Services × Log of Incidental Services -0.0630 (0.0663) 
Log of Freight Services × Log of Freight Services -0.0128 (0.0709) 
Log of Freight Services × Log of Incidental Services -0.2202 (0.1013) 
Log of Incidental Services × Log of Incidental Services 0.1659 (0.1050) 
Log of Capital Price × Log of Capital Price 0.0761 (0.0106) 
Log of Capital Price × Log of Labor Price 0.0109 (0.0178) 
Log of Capital Price × Log of Fuel Price -0.0464 (0.0082) 
Log of Labor Price × Log of Labor Price 0.1249 (0.0349) 
Log of Labor Price × Log of Fuel Price -0.0872 (0.0105) 
Log of Fuel Price × Log of Fuel Price 0.1935 (0.0150) 
Log of Passenger Services × Log of Capital Price 0.0608 (0.0239) 
Log of Passenger Services × Log of Labor Price -0.0015 (0.0314) 
Log of Passenger Services × Log of Fuel Price 0.0223 (0.0285) 
Log of Freight Services × Log of Capital Price -0.0492 (0.0290) 
Log of Freight Services × Log of Labor Price 0.0359 (0.0287) 
Log of Freight Services × Log of Fuel Price 0.0239 (0.0295) 
Log of Incidental Services × Log of Capital Price -0.0110 (0.0081) 
Log of Incidental Services × Log of Labor Price -0.0208 (0.0185) 
Log of Incidental Services × Log of Fuel Price -0.0280 (0.0142) 
Merge Dummy -0.0920 (0.0483) 
  
R2 0.88 
Number of Airlines 14 
Number of Equations 4 
Number of Observations 500 
Notes: a Output and input prices are normalized to their sample means before taking the log.   
            b Standard errors clustered at the airline level.  
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Table 6. Robustness Checks on the Effect of Merger on Airline Total Cost  
 (1) 
Baseline 
results 
(2) 
With time 
trend 
(3) 
Observations 
after 2007 
dropped 
(4) 
Non-Asian 
Airlines 
excluded from 
control group 
Merger dummy -0.0920 
(0.0483) 
-0.1404 
(0.0488) 
-0.0086 
(0.0594) 
-0.0424 
(0.0757) 
Merge Dummy × Time 
Trend 
 -0.0693 
(0.0214) 
  
     
Number of observations 500 500 332 216 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the airline level.   
 
The estimated coefficient of the merger dummy in the cost equation is the DID estimate of the 
effect of merger on airlines’ total costs. The baseline estimate indicates that the merger caused the total 
costs of the affected airlines to decrease by about 9%. We conduct the same robustness checks as in the 
non-parametric TFP regressions for the baseline findings and the results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
All of the robustness checks indicate cost reductions following the airline mergers and the effect of merger 
on airline costs is significant in most of the robustness checks. The effect of merger on airline costs is 
especially large and significant if we drop observations from 2004 to 2008 and define the post-merger 
period as 2009 to 2010. This evidence suggests that the effect of a merger on the airlines’ costs emerges 
several years later because the affected airlines need time to optimize their operations after the merger.         
   
Table 7. Robustness of Cost Results to Different Post-Merger Periods 
 (1) 
Post-merger 
period:  
2005-2010; 
observations 
in 2004 
dropped 
(2) 
Post-merger 
period:  
2006-2010; 
observations 
in 2004–2005 
dropped 
(3) 
Post-merger 
period:  
2009-2010; 
observations 
in 2004–2008 
dropped 
(4) 
Post-merger 
period:  
2009-2010; 
observations in 
2004–2008 
dropped; non-
Asian airlines 
excluded from 
control group 
Merger dummy -0.0812 
(0.0938) 
-0.1339 
(0.0984) 
-0.1009 
(0.0615) 
-0.1963 
(0.0671) 
     
Number of observations 444 388 220 96 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the airline level.   
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6. Discussion 
This study contributes to the literature by evaluating the effects of mergers on airline efficiency 
using a natural experiment in China. Similar airlines in terms of business models and operational strategies 
in other markets are used as the control group in the DID estimation. As major mergers have been carried 
out in worldwide aviation markets, our findings may serve as a useful reference for airlines and regulators 
alike. 
Nevertheless, our findings on the positive effects of mergers on airline efficiency should be used 
with caution in designing public policy. Productivity gains and cost reductions from mergers do not 
necessarily lead to welfare improvement because market concentration in the post-merger period may boost 
air fares. A complete merger evaluation should be based on a model incorporating the cost-side analysis 
with the market structure and demand-side analyses (Nevo and Whinston 2010). The findings from this 
study are useful for building such a model. For example, in building an airline competition model to 
simulate the welfare effects of merger, the 10-20% reduction in airline operation costs identified from the 
reduced-form approach can be incorporated into the airline competition in the post-merger period. In other 
words, the identified effect of merger on airline efficiency from the natural experiment can be used as the 
parameter in structural models to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of airline mergers.     
Great efforts were made to include a control group of non-merging Chinese airlines. However, the 
lack of comprehensive data on these carriers, which were much smaller and not privatized or listed on stock 
exchanges, meant that this was not possible. Therefore, we cannot totally rule out the possibility that the 
observed efficiency gains were due to other major changes in market conditions or regulations. Because the 
major policy changes, including the removal of price and route entry regulations, were carried out prior to 
the mergers, it is possible but unlikely that these confounding effects are significant. We hope that our study 
will lead to more novel research on this important issue. 
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